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Abstract
This paper is the first attempt to formalize a new field of economics; studding the Intangibles
Goods available on the Internet. We are taking advantage of the digital world’s specific rules, in
particular the zero marginal cost, to propose a theory of trading & sharing unified. A function
based money is created as a world-wide currency; ⊔ (pronounced /k2p/). We argue that our system
discourage speculation activities while it makes easy captured taxes for governments. The imple-
mentation removes the today’s paywall on the Internet and provides a simple-to-use, open-source,
free-of-charge, highly-secure, person-to-person, privacy-respectful, digital payment tool for citizens,
using standard smart-phones with a strong authentication. Next step will be the propagation of
the network application and we expect many shared benefits for the whole economics development.
keywords: Economics, Internet, Intangible Good, Sharing, Trading, Money, Digital Signature, Payment,
Currency, Exchange Rate, Cultural Piracy, Copyright, Paywall, Peer-to-peer, Zero Marginal Cost, Collab-
orative Commons, Speculation, Open-source.
1 Introduction
Sharing and Trading seem first conflicting in our everyday physical experience of Tangibles Goods
(tg). When we share something, it’s usually free of charge and there is no declared ownership. People
are involved in a strong relationship, as friends. On the contrary, buying an object defines explicitly
the owner and exclude other people from having or using the good. Trading means that the seller is
dispossessed of the good against a financial reward, after a one-to-one instantaneous relationship.
Furthermore, the buyer and the seller may be completely anonymous from each other.
Is a Merchant Sharing Theory likely to be impossible?
Well, the digital world carried by the Internet is following different rules than the physical world.
Our purpose here is to show that over the Internet, sharing and trading are not only compatibles,
but have tremendous advantages to be associated. The following theory introduces a breakthrough
in the economics domain, making new potentially growing markets and new business opportunities.
Since Internet is very young compared to the history of merchant exchange, all applications and all
consequences of this theory are not yet well evaluated, but all the technologies are available for a
generalized primary usage. Our proposal opens a new and exciting field of research and investigation.
2 Theory construction
Starting from the evaluation of marginal cost (Figure 1), we are proposing an axiomatization of
economics for the Internet.
Axiom 1 An Intangible Good1 (ig) is a virtual object having a significant value for a set of
individuals, and a null margin cost.
1see fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bien_immateriel
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Figure 1: The Marginal Cost defines the type of economy; Mc = 0 for ig,Mc = ǫ for tg andMc = max
for prototype.
Only the Internet is able to save and to publish an ig. Any file can be duplicated on any network
node at no cost. End users are investing themselves in terminal computers, phones, storage devices,
so the marginal cost for the producer of an ig is null. Any tangible good (tg) may have a very low
margin cost with large scale mass production, but this cost is never null. Internet also store data for
private communications, without any value in public publishing. This data is not considered as an ig.
Creator: The creator of an ig is one individual or a group of individuals using high skills and spending
time to create the ig. This work deserve a direct or indirect financial reward for the creator.
Customer: A customer of an ig in one individual owning a sufficient amount of money to acquire
the right to use that ig any time all his life, on any device2, without any drm3 attached nor
advertising.
Transaction: (Figure 2) For a given ig, Internet allows to define a one-to-many temporal relation
Fc(i, t) between the creator and the effective i customers. As soon as the ig is published,
customers are free to choose the time for buying the ig, without the creator agreement. In
the same ig relation, any new buyer, in position i, time t, may spend a price Pti , making for
the creator an income Iti and for the i − 1 previous j buyers as a refund R
t
ij. Unlike for a tg
transaction requiring transportation and transformations, no intermediate actor is requested in
the pure digital ig transaction, thus no additional fee is required in ig relation. So the following
equation states:
∀i ∈ N∗ Pti = I
t
i +
j≤i∑
j=1
Rtij
Starting from now, the time parameter t is skipped because our main proposal is time independent,
but we do not exclude to define in next developments a time dependent solution, specially for time
valuated ig like for flash paper news.
Hypothesis 1 The price Pi is only dependent of the position i of the buyer in the list (eventually
the time of the buying action), but never dependent of buyer personal features/data or buyer financial
capabilities.
Hypothesis 2 For a given ig and knowing that the margin cost is null while the production cost is
finite. It is a fair principle to bound the cumulative income Ti with a fixed value, T∞, chosen by the
2This right is referenced as the ”mobiquity” right.
3Digital Right Management
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creator and known universally.
∀i ∈ N∗ Ti =
k≤i∑
k=1
Ik lim
i→∞
Ti = T∞
Then we have:
lim
i→∞
Pi = 0 (1)
As I is always positive or null, the cummulative income T is increasing:
∀i ∈ N∗ T
′
i ≥ 0
Hypothesis 3 For a given ig, the price function Pi is decreasing. If two customers ask to buy the
same ig at the same time, the displayed price has to be higher than the effective price.
∀i ∈ N∗ P
′
i ≤ 0
Hypothesis 4 For a given ig and for any purchase number i, the refunding values Rij for j < i are
equal.
∀i ∈ N∗ ∀j < i Rij = Ri
Then we can verify the equations:
Pi = Ii + (i− 1)Ri (2)
Ti = iPi (3)
Ii = Ti − Ti−1 (4)
Theorem 1 At the same time, all i buyers had payed, including the refunds, the very same price to
get the same ig. This price is equal to Pi.
Theorem 2 For an ig given by its creator with initial price P1 and a limit cumulative income T∞,
It exists a solution satisfying previous hypothesis.
The previous hypothesis can be summerized in the less formalized principle of fairness:
Principle 1 Creator cumulative income of an ig is bounded while every time, all buyers pay the very
same price down to zero.
The most significant relation is between unitary price and cumulative income and is called the
“Pelinquin” equation, showing the fragile equilibrium between increasing T and decreasing P:
T րi = iP
ց
i (“Pelinquin” continuous)
We seen that ig transactions follows rules not as simple as for the physical world where only a
one-to-one relation occurs. We used to use the equation P = I +
∑
i fi. The fi are fees taken by
intermediaries for transportation and transformation and are subject to speculation. Prices, incomes
are scalars and refund is null for tangibles goods. However, for ig, its price is a function and the
relation is a little more complex to manage the automatic refund. We introduced a breakthrough in
traditional economics exchange.
One can note that the “pelinquin” equation still applies for pre-industrial phase in the simple case
where i = 1, that is T = P and also for industrial phase where unitary price is constant; then Ti = iP .
The next section proposes a function solution family with ”smooth” variations. This family requires
only one tuning parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1] called speed parameter.
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Figure 2: Intangible Good; a perpetual many-to-many, relation.
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Figure 3: Income, Price and Refund values for a 5⊔1000 ig and ξ = 0.3.
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Figure 4: Income and Price evolution of a 1⊔100 ig for ξ = 0.25.
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3 The exponential family
For an ig sold at the first price P1 and expecting an income T∞, the three related computed values
are:
• Pi the price a buyer has to pay the good in position i
• Ii the additional income to the creator for a purchase in position i, Ti is the cumulative income.
• Ri the refunding value given to all previous (i− 1) consumers of the same good
A piece linear model solution exists but we present here the exponential based solution. For this
model, with a speed parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1] selected by the creator, and with:
λ =
(
T∞ − P1
T∞ − 2P1
)ξ
we have I1 = P1, R1 = 0 and ∀i > 1 and (Figure 3):
Pi =
T∞ + (P1 − T∞)λ
1−i
i
(5)
Ii = (1− λ)(P1 − T∞)λ
1−i (6)
Ri =
T∞ + λ
1−i (1 + i(λ− 1)) (P1 − T∞)
i(i− 1)
(7)
The total income (Figure 4) is:
Ti = T∞ + (P1 − T∞)λ
1−i (8)
Pi, Ii and Ri are decreasing while Ti is increasing and we check that:
lim
i→∞
Pi = 0 lim
i→∞
Ti = T∞
3.1 The numerical rounding issue
The implementation of the solution over the Internet raises a numerical rounding issue for the money.
There is computational benefits to use integers instead of floating point. The Pelinquin equation
becomes with integers:
∃k ∈ [0, i] Ti = (i− k)Pi + k (Pi + 1) (“Pelinquin” discrete)
All buyers will not pay exactly the same price (including refunds) as for the continuous case, but the
non-equity is bounded by 1 unit (arround 10 cents according to conversion rate described hereafter).
We have first to select carefuly the k distribution parameter so that any buyers is always asked to
pay only once (she never have to add 1 unit later on). Thus, the real integer income is slightly
overestimated compared to the continuous case. Second, we must check that the cumulative income
remains increasing.
Our investigations defined the interger-based function-price algorithm (See algorithm 1)4 that returns
Pi and the distribution parameter k.
Simulation confirms than cumulative income is increasing and price always decreasing for any
buyer (refunds are always positive). However, we are looking for a mathematical proof of those two
properties with such algorithm. Moreover, many loops can occur in the while statement, and we will
investigate a shorter and more optimized version of the algorithm.
From a general viewpoint, we argue that the paradigm shifting in using a refunding mechanism
requires to introduce a new money/currency, noted with the squarecup symbol: ⊔5, dedicated to
ig, with main features:
4implementation is available on https://github.com/pelinquin/pingpongcash/blob/master/node.py
5pronounced /k2p/
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Algorithm 1 function-price (P1,T∞, ξ, i)
Require: P1 > 0 ∧ T∞ > 2P1 ∧ i > 0 ∧ ξ ∈ [0, 1]
Ensure: T ր ∧ Pց ∧ k ∈ [0, i]
if ξ = 0 then
P = integer (P1/i)
if P = 0 then
if i < T∞ then
return 0, 0
else
return 0, i− T∞
end if
else
return P, i (P + 1)− P1
end if
end if
λ←
(
T∞−P1
T∞−2P1
)ξ
TA ← T∞ + (P1 − T∞)λ
1−i
P ← integer
(
TA
i
)
j ← i
k ← i(P + 1)− round(TA)
while true do
j ← j + 1
TB ← T∞ + (P1 − T∞)λ
1−j
Q ← integer
(
TB
j
)
y ← j(Q+ 1)− round(TB)
if P 6= Q then
return P, k
end if
if k ≥ y + i− j then
k ← y + i− j
else
return P, k
end if
if k < 0 then
return P, 0
end if
if j − y = T∞ then
return P, k
end if
end while
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• ⊔ is vector based; (P1,T∞, ξ) or function based but not scalar based unlike e, $ or £.
• ⊔ is an universal/international currency dedicated to intangible goods of the Internet, world-wide
by construction.
• ⊔ is from design integer based, with a unit value around 10 cents; the smaller price to get a
significant ig. The exchange rate value is explained in section 5.
• ⊔ is not sensitive to speculation actions. . . see section 6 for details on this point.
For integer computation, the full transaction has to remain well balanced. As soon as the cumulative
income approach the expected value, all entities (price, income, refund, become very small, so we must
select the more suited rounding policy. An admissible solution is to round first the income Ii and
second the refund value Ri, then compute the price as:
Pi = Ii + (i− 1)Ri
This way, all the money given by a new coming customer is shared between the creator and the pre-
vious buyers.
We may find two interesting values:
No refunding threshold : the value inr for which: ∀i ≥ inr Ri = 0
Public domain threshold : the value ipd for which: ∀i ≥ ipd Ii = Pi = Ri = 0
It is obviously verified that inr < ipd and as the ⊔ money is integer based, we have:
ipd = T∞ (9)
The first ipd customers had paid 1⊔ and all the other get the ig for free.
4 No paywall
Beyond the idea that Internet pushing and speeding-up trading of tangibles goods, it remains today a
paywall on the Net. The current main payment systems; VISA, Mastercard, PayPal. . . are in the same
time too complex, poorly secure, and very expensive for any citizen (merchant or customer). This is
particularly unfortunate for ig creators who can’t publish their work directly on the Net, on their own
server, just because they do not have access to an automatic, in the Net stack, free payment system
to get their incomes. One click payment attends to fix that paywall but raises privacy issues as we
see for Google-wallet or iTunesStore. We argue that a distributed, open-source, free of charge solution
is technically possible and it would promote a new peer-to-peer publishing, instead of concentration
on huge intermediary private platforms. This digital payment system called Ping-Pong-Cash is fully
adapted to ⊔ trading for ig but also provides great usage for traditional trading of tg, using e or $
currencies.
Authentication is a key point for digital payment. That’s why our system requires a three ways
authentication:
• Something you carry (phone, card, usb stick. . . )
• Something you know (PIN, passphrase. . . )
• Something on you (bio-metric data)
The smartphone is likely the best device to enable this strong autentication. It store a locally generated
private key while the public key is readable universally on a Ditributed Hash Table dht. A transaction
is simply a message digitally signed by the buyer. The selected digital signature algorithm is ecdsa
with the P521 NIST eliptic curve6. Private key usage is protected by aes 256 symetric encryption.
Any user who buy an ig received an encrypted url, when decrypted, downloads the full file.
6http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/nist-routines.pdf
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5 Exchange rate proposal
The ⊔ money is not created from scratch, it is more considered as a unit computed value based on
a shared formula. The ⊔ currency is then convertible with most local currencies in the World. Let
define as C the finite subset of n currencies not including the ⊔. rtij is the exchange rate between the
currency i and currency j at discrete date t. Each currency i has a known volume vi in the world and
v is the total volume. Volumes are supposed stable during long time periods. The trivial solution for
fixing rt⊔k for any currency k would have been to sum all current exchange rates for currencies in C
weighted by their respective volume vi as:
∀t ∈ N,∀k ∈ C rt⊔k =
1
v
i<n∑
i=0
vir
t
ik
As it as been set for the ECU in 1999[7] for introducing the Euro. This definition would not
minimize the time variation of the exchange rate with other currency, making an opportunity to
engage speculation with such currency. To fix this issue, we consider that exchange rates are given
each day, so t′ means the day after t. Let select randomly a currency k in C and we are facing the
problem of defining the exchange rate r⊔k between ⊔ and k. One has to select an initial value r0 = r
0
⊔k
at the date of birth for the international currency.
We proposes a recursive algorithm that computes rt
′
⊔k knowing r
t
⊔k for a given currency k but all
other exchange rates with other currencies i are immediately computed with:
rt⊔i = r
t
⊔kr
t
ki ∀t ∈ N ∀i ∈ C
Let define the value:
V = min
rt
′
⊔k
(
i<n∑
i=0
vi
∣∣∣∣∣1− r
t′
⊔i
rt⊔i
∣∣∣∣∣
)
This value V can be written:
V = min
rt
′
⊔k
(
i<n∑
i=0
vi
∣∣∣∣∣1− r
t′
ki
rtkir
t
⊔k
rt
′
⊔k
∣∣∣∣∣
)
= min
rt
′
⊔k
(
i<n∑
i=0
∣∣∣airt′⊔k + bi∣∣∣
)
with ai and bi known constants.
The previous multi pieces linear equation has one solution (Figure 5) satisfying: ∃j ∈ C, rt
′
⊔k = −bj/aj
For such currency j that minimize the value V, we have:
rt
′
⊔k =
rtkj
rt
′
kj
rt⊔k
If:
Vi =
∑
i 6=j
vi
∣∣∣∣∣1− r
t′
⊔i
rt⊔i
∣∣∣∣∣
then j is such that V = min (Vi)
The algorithm simply computes the Vi for all currencies of C and find the j currency that does not
change its rate between t and t′. The currency solution j is always independent of the selected currency
k used at first reference.
Let now define the value function:
V =
i<n∑
i=0
vi
(
1−
rt
′
⊔i
rt⊔i
)2
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Figure 5: Value function for rt⊔$ = 13, then minimum reach for r
t′
⊔$ = 12.9253818743.
This polynomial function of degree two has a unique minimum for:
∀k ∈ C rt
′
⊔k =


i<n∑
i=0
rt
′
ki
rtki
vi
i<n∑
i=0
(
rt
′
ki
rtki
)2
vi

 r
t
⊔k = K
tt′
k .r
t
⊔k
Knowing exchange rates between all currencies in C for all days from an initial date, one can compute
the Ktt
′
k delta coefficient and then exchange rate with ⊔ for all those days, starting with a fixed initial
value. Our proposal for the most used currency in the set:
C = {usd,eur, jpy,gsp,aud,chf,cad,hkd, sek,nzd, sgd,krw,nok,mxn, inr}
with their respective volume value[3]:
v = {849, 391, 190, 129, 76, 64, 53, 24, 22, 16, 15, 15, 13, 13, 9}
6 Speculation
The exchange rate for ⊔ as defined in the previous section protects the currency from speculation
attacks. There are mainly five reasons for that resistance:
• As an international currency, available all over the Internet, there is no need for currency ex-
change. The ratio is the most stable from the set C of reference currencies, so any fluctuation
of ⊔ means that other currencies has changed. However, the algorithm is fully deterministic
knowing the daily exchange rates between currencies in C and one exchange with ⊔ the day
before. Authorities or human evaluation cannot change the new exchange rate. Anybody in the
world can compute it to get the same result7.
• Any Intangible Good is sold on the Internet in ⊔ at the same price whatever the development
level of the population. Then, there is no local market places with different prices and possible
speculation gains.
7
⊔ exchange rate started January 1, 2014 with an initial value 1⊔ = 0.1e. On May 7, 2014, the value is 1⊔ =
0.09840473135599744e.
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Figure 6: Trading difference between Intangible Good (ig) and Tangible Good (tg).
• ⊔ exchange with other currencies are subject to support a selling and buying tax going to the
government or financial authority in charge of the foreign currency. For instance to exchange
$ into e using ⊔, one has to pay a tax to eec for buying ⊔ from e and a tax for the USA for
selling ⊔ into $. As we see, there is no advantage for traders to use ⊔ between currencies on the
market exchange.
• ⊔ is dedicated to Intangible Good exchange and the transaction is atomic (money in ⊔ against
the URL of the good). There is not a double transaction like in the tangible world (Figure 6).
Any undervalued or overvalued transaction using ⊔ is immediately suspect and may hide another
illegal transaction. Transactions without a real intangible good are only allowed for the same
individual to change local currency into ⊔ in order to buy cultural goods or for an artist earning
⊔ to change them into the local currency. It is not allowed for one person to ⊔ from another
person against euros for instance. There should always exists an intangible good published over
the Internet by the seller.
• ⊔ economics follows different rules than the classical economics for tangible goods. The mecha-
nism of refunding of previous buyers when new buyers are coming makes ⊔ the first functional
or non scalar currency. Those different rules makes more clear the necessity to define a new
currency. It could have been possible to computes transaction following the fair intangible good
principle using euro, but then people would have to carefully make the difference between euros
for tangible goods, without refunding and euros for intangible goods with refunding and bound
income. Some sellers of cultural goods on the Internet may have use the same currency name to
sell without refunding and without bound income, an clearly unfair transaction.
7 Conclusion
In economics, this paper proposed a new paradigm dedicated to Intangible Good trading fully con-
sistent with sharing. Thanks to the Internet to make the theory possible and verifiable in real life.
We introduced the ⊔ convertible, functional money, we shown the resistance against speculation and
we argued on the need to deploy as soon as possible, an easy-to-use, free-of-charge, open-source, dis-
tributed, secure digital payment system for person-to-person exchanges, both for ig and for tg. Next
study will detail the network architecture and the peer-to-peer node design, including cryptographic
primitives.
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